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BLEEDING HEARTS AND PEELING FLOORS :
COMPENSATION FOR ECONOMIC LOSS
AT THE HOUSE OF LORDS
DAVID COHENt

The decision of the House of Lords in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi
Ltd? represents an un\vmanted development in the law of tort and
contract, unless its rationale and limitations are fully appreciated.
This reform in such an important area is premature "in the absence
of hard data on the probable impact of such an extensionJy2
of liability. Much of the published commentary on recovery of economic loss
in to$ and on this decision in particular, has been written from
the ex post perspective of accident compensation doctrine and
theory. Most writers have been concerned with the development of
positive rules of law designed to provide compensation and redress
$ Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
@ David Cohen, 1984.
1

2

3

[1982] 3 ALL E.R. 201, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 477. I will refer to the case as
junior Books, and all citations will be to the W.L.R. This decision is supported by recent Canadian cases which arrive a t a similar result. See Gold
et al. v. DeHauilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd. (1983) 25 C.C.L.T. 180, at
188 (B.C.S.C.). Cf. Soursos and Soursos v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al. [1983] 3 W.W.R. 716 (B.C.S.C.) ;Hofstrand Farms Ltd. v. The
Queen in Right of British Columbia and B.D.C. Ltd. (1982) 131 D.L.R.
(3rd) 464, [1982] 2 W.W.R. 492 (B.C.C.A.).
Junior Books has already been the subject of academic comment. See
S. Waddams, Tort Liability for Economic Loss: junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi
Co. Ltd. (1983-84) 8 CAN.BUS. L.J. lor; J. Holyoak, Tort and Contract
After junior Books (1983) gg L.Q. REV.590.
1 Ontario Law Reform Commission, REPORT
ON THE SALE OF GOODS
(19791, a t 243The more important articles on recovery of economic loss in tort to which
the reader is referred include J. A. Smillie, Negligence and Economic Loss
(1982) 32 U. OF T. L.J. 231; R. E. Speidel, Products Liability, Economic
L. REV. 309; P. F. Cane, Physical
Loss and the U.C.C. (1973) 40 TENN.
Loss, Economic Loss and Products Liability (1979) 95 L.Q. REV. I 17; P. S.
Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss (1967) 83 L.Q. REV. 248; L. L.
Stevens, Negligent Acts Causing Pure Financial Loss: Policy Factors at Work
(1973) 23 U. OF T. L.J. 431. Other leading articles are cited in later footnotes.
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to an individual who alleges a loss or injury to his economic interests. This paper takes a different approach, and examines the larger
social and economic issues. It is important to articulate private legal
mles and policies (developed incrementally in contract and tort
claims, or more dramatically in regulatory agendas) insofar as they
encourage or prevent individual choice to be exercised in decisions
to assume risks to economic interests. Junior Books is simply an
incremental development in the evolution of legal rules which
may restrict choice, and which provide individuals with protection
against the occurrence of an expanding universe of risks. Whether
that is desirable depends on one's view of distributive justice, individual autonomy and efficient allocation of risk?
The facts in Junior Books have been set out by Professor Smith
in the past volume of this Review: and I will describe them only
briefly. The defendant9 were flooring specialists who in the fall of
I 969 and the spring of 1970, laid the flooring in the production area
of a factory under construction for the plaintiff owners. The flooring
was a magnesium oxychloride wmposition which was laid on a concrete base.7 The defendants carried out the work pursuant to a
contract with Ogdvie (Builders) Ltd., the main contractors. Ogilvie
(Builders) Ltd., who were not parties to the litigation, had wntracted with the owners to build the factory. The terms of this construction contract were not considered by the judges and thus the
contractual performance obligations of the main contractors, and
any relevant exclusion clauses, were not subject to analysis.8 It is
accepted that there was no element of risk of physical injury or of
4

5

6

7
8

The House of Lords does not agree. I t seemed, at least to Lord Roskill, that
the decision was to be made as a matter of principle rather than policy:
Junior Books, supra, note I , a t 488. He thus refused to consider the administrative and social costs of permitting such claims. For an analysis of the
principle/policy distinction see R. Dworkin, Hard Cases (1975) 88 HARV.
L. REV. I 057; D.Horowik, THECOURTSAND SOCIALPOLICY( 1977), at 34.
J. C. Smith, Economic Loss and the Common Law Marriage of Contracts
and Torts (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. REV. 95.
The case was in the House of Lords on appeal from the Second Division of
the Court of Session of Scotland. I have chosen not to use the Scottish legal
terminology of defenders, pursuers, delict, interlocut, condescendence, and
averments, in the interests of readers who may not be thoroughly familiar
with the terminology.
The Scottish law of delict and the English law of negligence are not
materially different on the issues discussed in the case. Junior Books, supra,
note I, per Lord Roskill, at 486.
Id., at 480.
Id. This omission, while it was referred to in the judgments of Lord Roskill
at 495, and of Lord Fraser at 483, is of critical importance in determining
what is meant by "defective" flooring. See injra at text accompanying note 93.
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property damage, or any economic loss other than that which related to the replacement of the flooring.'
Some time in 1972, the plaintiff discovered that the flooring was
lifting from its concrete base. The explanation for the separation
of the magnesium oxychloride compound from the base was variously attributed ,to ,the proportion of the chemicals and water used
in producing the solution, and to ,the nature of the floor laying activities of the defendantlo The plaintiff sought to recover
£206,00o representing: the cost of replacing the floor (£50,000) ,ll
book storage costs (£I ,000) , machinery relocation expenses (£2 ,ooo) ,lost profits on the temporary closing of the factory ( £ ~ ~ , o o o ) ,
contractual liability to employees ( £go,ooo) ,overhead (2I 6,000)
and investigation costs associated with the flooring replacement
(23,ooo) .I2
The House of Lords decidedu that the plaintiff could in theory
recover compensation for all these kinds of losses in an action in
tort. There was no requirement that the economic losses be linked
to actual or potential personal injury, to actual or potential damage
to other property of the plaintiff, or even to an accident to the
property distributed to the plaintiff. The compensable economic
injury was associated only with a "quality" attribute of the product
manufactured by the defendant, and with associated economic
losses. The decision is directly contrary to all authoritative Canadian decisions on point which, for a variety of reasons, have denied
recovery in such cases.'* Traditional (and exceedingly enigmatic)
I t is important to note that the issue is one of risk rather than loss. As I
point out later, the limitation on recovery is based on the absence of risk
rather than losses related to personal injuries or property damage.
10 Since the case was decided on an interlocutory motion, the nature of the
defendant's activities and whether they constituted negligence were.not at
issue.
11 Lord Keith, however, articulated this loss to represent a reduction in profits
associated with the defendant's negligence rather than a loss related to a
diminution in the value of the floor. See Junior Books, supra, note I, at 485.
1 2 A strong argument can be made that the plaintiffs, if allowed to recover for
all of these losses, would certainly be over-compensated. See Sunnyside Greenhouses Ltd. v. Golden West See& Ltd. (1972) 27 D.L.R. (gd) 434 (ALTA.
S.C. APP.D.), afPd (1973) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 384 (S.C.C.) ;N. Biger and A. S.
Rosen, A Framework for the Assessment of Business Damages for Breach of
Contract (1981) 5 CAN.BUS. L.J. 302, a t 308-26.
13 Supra, note I, with Lord Brandon of Oakbrook dissenting, at 496.
14 See Ital-Canadian Investments Ltd. v. North Shore Plumbing and Heating
Co. et al. 119781 4 W.W.R. 289 (B.C.S.C.) ; Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works et al. [1974] S.C.R. 1189, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, 119731
6 W.W.R. 692.
9
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decisions describe the inability of an individual to recover economic
lasses in tort as a result of the losses being too remote,15or not being
causally related to the allegedly tortious act?" Other equally abstruse decisions state that no duty of care is owed in such circumstance~.'~
A more functional analysis articulated by some judges and
commentators regards the purpose of ,tort law as the promotion of
safety. This thesis holds that a reduction in the value of an article
A related rationale,
which is "safe but shoddy" is not reco~erable.~~
commonly expressed in American case law, is that economic loss
associated with "loss of bargain" is appropriately dealt with by
contract law?' Clearly, the decision in Junior Books requires a reconsideration of all of these limitations on recovery.
For the purposes of this comment, and in light of the facts in
Junior Books itself, I will consider the issue of recovery of economic
loss in tort in the context of a product manufactured by a remote
manufacturer, who distributes the good to an intermediate supplier,
who then distributes the good to a buyer. The first contract, between
the remote manufacturer and intermediate supplier, will be referred
to as the wholesale contract. The second contract, between the
intermediate supplier and the buyer, I will refer to as the retail contract. I will assume, as was the case in Junior Books, that the buyer
alleges that the product does not function in accordance with his
expectations and that he has suffered the following financial losses :
See S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W . J. Whittal d Son Ltd. 119711
r Q.B. 337, at 344 (C.A.) ;A. Linden, CANADIAN
TORT
LAW(3rd ed. 1982),
at 441; Yumerovski et al. v . Dani (1978) 18 O.R. (nd) 704 (ONT. CO.
CT.) ; Weiner v. Zoratti (1970) r I D.L.R. (3d) 598 (MAN.Q.B.) ; Gypsum
Carrier Inc. v. The Queen (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 175 (F.C.T.D.), at
187-94; Trappa Holdings Ltd. v. Dktrict of Surrey (1979) 95 D.L.R. (3d)
I 07 (B.C.S.C.) .
16 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Foundation Co. bf Canada Ltd. (1977) 75 D.L.R.
(gd) 294, [1g77] 2 W.W.R. 717 (B.C.S.C.).
17 Dutton u. Bognor Regk Urban District Council [1g72] I Q.B. 373, at 414
(C.A.); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v . St. Lawrence Seaway Authority et al.
[1978] I F.C. 464, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 522 (F.C.T.D.) ;Spartan Steel d Alloys
Ltd. v. Martin d Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1g73] Q.B. 27 (C.A.).
18 J. G. Fleming, THELAWOF TORTS
(6th ed. 1 9 8 3 ) ~at 476. Ital-Canadian
Investments Ltd. v . North Shore Plumbing and Heating Co. Ltd., supra,
note 14; Thomas et al. v. Whitehouse (1979) 95 D.L.R. (3d) 762, at 767
(N.B.S.C., APP. D.) ;Young d Marten Ltd. v. McManus Childs Ltd. 119691
I A.C. 454, a t 469 (H.L.) ; Nielson et al. v . City of Kamloops (1981) 129
D.L.R. (3d) I r I (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
granted, 41 N.R. 538. S. Schwartz, Jurisprudential Developments in Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Products when the only Damage is Economic Loss (1979-80) 4 CAN.BUS. L.J. 164, at 177.
19 P. F. Cane, supra, note 3, at 130.
15
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a) a loss representing the difference between the retail contract
price and the value of the product he expected to receive;
b) a loss representing the difference between the retail contract
price and the market value of the defective goods;
c) a loss representing the cost of repairing the object. The repair
costs are limited either by the contract price or the expected
value of the good;
d) a loss representing expenses incurred by the buyer which are
wasted as a result of the malfunctioning product;
e) a loss representing expenses incurred by the buyer which would
not have been necessary if the good had functioned in accordance with the buyer's expectations;
f) a loss representing a financial gain (other than those in (a) )
which was not achieved as a result of the malfunctioning; and
g) a loss representing consequential financial liability to third parties
caused by the malfunction.
Junior Books, on its face, suggests that all of these losses are now
recoverable in
Junior Books is only one of a number of tools which have been
used by the courts, or .which have been adopted by regulators, to
shift economic risks from one individual (the buyer) to another
(the remote supplier) when we think it appropriate to do so."
First, there are collateral contracts, based on remote supplier representations, which in the case of direct'^ relationships can shift all
economic risks described above to the remote ~upplier.'~It is, of
course, much more difficult to persuade the courts to shift these
risks in the context of general advertising programs where the parties
are not dealing directly with one another. Second, the courts have
However, Lord Keith specifically denied recovery for losses representing a
diminution in the value of the good distributed.
2 1 Although in some cases the courts suggest that the legislature ought to take
this decision. See Attorney-General for Ontario v. Fatehi et al. (1981) 34
O.R. (2d) 129, 18 C.C.L.T. 97 (ONT. C.A.).
n See Shanklin Pier Ltd. v. Detel Products Ltd. [1g51] 2 K.B. 854; Wells
(Merstham) Ltd. v. Buckland Sand and Silica Ltd. [1965] 2 Q.B. 170;
Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. et al. (1979) 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113, 23 O.R.
(2d) 456 (ONT. H.C.). The requirement of a direct relationship was explicitly recognized in Lambert et al. v. Lewis et al. [1g7g] R.T.R. 61, a t
93-94; rev'd in part [1g80] 2 W.L.R. 299, at 327 (C.A.). The decision
was varied on appeal, [1g81] I Am..E.R. I 185 (H.L.).
Of course, where the issue is compensation for physical injuries, the scope
of the collateral contract doctrine might be expected to be much broader and
thus may not require the direct relationship. See Leitz v. Saskatoon Drug
and Stationary Co. and T.C. Distributors (1970) Ltd. (No. 2 ) (1980) 4
SASK.L.R. 35 (SASK.Q.B.).

"0
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used the negligent misrepresentation doctrine as an economic riskshifting tool.23In these decisions, again limited to cases where the
remote supplier is in a direct relationship with the buyer, the courts
impose liability for economic losses where the risk is ccvoluntarily
accepted or ~ndertaken".~~
Third, where the direct relationship is
contractual in nature, the courts will shift these economic risks under
the guise of implied tams of merchantability and fitness for purpose.25Finally, civilian doctrine has been developed at the Supreme
Court of Canada which, drawing from principles developed in
French lawYz6
establishes a continuing or transferable warranty flowing from manufacturers to ultimate consumer^.^ Under this floating
warranty doctrine, a buyer in Quebec can recover pure economic
losses from a remote supplier. Indeed, the remote supplier cannot
by contract limit the liability associated with the application of this
legal warranty. There is little doubt that the decision was as significant to the civil law as Junior Books is to the common law.z8
These common law and civilian developments are themselves
simply an aspect of a much broader program of legislative reform
directed to the same end. Proposed consumer warranty and sales
23

"
25

26

27

E.g., Herrington et al. v. Kenco Mortgage B Investments Ltd. et al. (1981)
125 D.L.R. (3d) 377 (B.C.S.C.) (negligent misrepresentation of value of
property secured by mortgage influencing decisions of purchaser of mortgage
from mortgage broker); McBean v. Bank of Nova Scotia et al. (1981) 15
B.L.R. 296 (ONT. H.C.) (negligent advice of bank as to economic risks of
investment decision).
Hedley Byrne B Co. v. Heller B Partners Ltd. Ex9643 A.C. 465; 119633 2
ALL E.R. 575 (H.L.), per Lord Devlin, at 529.
The similarity between recovery of economic loss in tort and the implication
of implied terms in a contractual setting was noted by several members of the
Court in Junior Books, supra, note I. See Lord Brandon at 499, Lord Roskill
at 495See D. Tebbens, INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCT
LIABILITY(1g7g), at 97; B. S.
Markesinis, The Not So Dissimilar Tort and Delict (1977) 93 L.Q. REV. 78,
at 101.
General Motors Products of Canada Ltd. v . Kravitz [1g7g] I S.C.R. 790,
93 D.L.R. (3d) 481. The Supreme Court decision anticipated proposed
revisions to the Civil Code which imposed direct warranty obligations on
manufacturers, and the enactment oP the Quebec Consumer Protection Act,
S.Q. 1978 c. g, s. 53. Both would seem to extend protection for pure economic loss to buyers. See Quebec Civil Code Revision Office, I REPORTON
THE QUEBEC
CIVIL CODE (1977); Draft Civil Code, Book Five, OBLIGATIONS, S. 102.

28

An entire issue of the MCGILL LAW JOURNAL was devoted to the w e .
(1980) 25 MCGILLL.J. 296. S. Schwartz, The Manufacturers' Liability to
a Purchaser of a "Lemon": A Review of the Situation in Canada After
General Motors Products of Canada Ltd. v . Krauitz (1979) I I OTTAWA
L. REV. 583.
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legislation in Ontario,29proposed sales reform in Alberta,"" the Uniform Sale of Goods Act recently proposed by the Uniform Law
and consumer protection legislation curConference of Canada:'
rently in force in New BrunswidP will permit recovery of pure
economic loss against remote suppliers in various contexts. I n addition Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and Alberta
have for several decades permitted buyers of farm implements to
recover economic losses from remote suppliers under a floating warranty theory.33
This sales and warranty legislative reform, which reflects attitudes
similar to those evident in Junior Books, is complemented by trade
practice legislation34which provides for recovery of economic losses
from remote suppliers in cases of ,disappointed consumer expectations associated both with positive acts of misrepresentation and
with "conduct" and non-disclosure of information which leads to
It could be argued that the introduction
disappointed e~pectations.9~
of products into the marketplace may create reasonable expectations
of product quality? and that privity of contract is not a prerequisite
to recovery under trade practice legi~lation.~~
Ontario Law Reform Commission, REPORTON CONSUMER
WARRANTIES
AND
GUARANTEES
IN THE SALEOF GOODS(1972)~a t 71. Cf. sujra, note 2, a t
243-55.
30 Institute of Law kesearch and Reform, Report No. 38, THEUNIFORW
SALE
OF GOODS
ACT {1982), a t I 15-27.
31 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE S m - T H I R DANNUAL
MEETINGOF THE UNIFORM
LAW CONFERENCE
OF CANADA
(1981)~Appendix gb a t 185-321; Section
5.18 of the Uniform Sale of Goods Act.
32 Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, ss.
23 and 2.
33 Farm Implement Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. F-4; The Agricultural Implements
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. A-10; Farm Machinery and Equipment Act, S.M. 1971,
c. 83; Farm Implements Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. F-3.
34 See Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55; Trade Practices Act, S. Nfld.
1978, c. 10; Business Practices Act, S.P.E.I. 1977, c. 31; Unfair Trade
Practices Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33; Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406;
Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. g.
35 Id.: British Columbia, ss. 3 ( I ) (a), 3 (3) (4) ;Ontario, s. 2 (a) (xiii) ;Alberta,
s. 4(1) (i); Newfoundland, s. 5(1). See G. Q. Taperell, TRADE
PRACTICES
AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION(and ed. 1978)~a t 494; A. K. Turner,
BY REPRESENTATION
(3rd ed. 1977), a t 46-47; Bodger v. Nicholls
ESTOPPEL
(1873) 28 L.T. (N.S.) 441 (Q.B.); Mullet v. Mason (1866) I L.R.C.P.
559; C.R.F. Holdings Ltd. et al. u. Fundy Chemical International Ltd. et al.
(1982) 19 C.C.L.T. 263 (B.C.C.A.).
38 B. J. Reiter, Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance, Study 8 in J. Swan
IN CONTRACT
LAW(1980)~a t 307.
and B. J. Reiter (eds.), STUDIES
37 Sujra, note 34. Both Alberta and British Columbia have apparently abolished
the privity doctrine in the context of the distribution of goods by commercial
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This expansion of liability for economic losses, reflected in the
evolution of common law contract and tort doctrine, in civil law,
and in sales and trade practice legislative reform, has not met with
universal approval. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to Products Ligbility of I 972 specifically excludes recovery for pure
economic 1 0 s . As
~ well, the English Law Commission in its Report
on Liability for Defective Products recommended against the application of strict liability to economic losses.39 In Canada, the Saskatchewan Consumer Products Warranties Act,m whiie it extends
implied warranty protection to remote users, limits recovery to cases
of personal injury. American developments in tort and contract
demonstrate a similar ambivalence towards this issue, although the
majority of states have adopted rules denying recovery of some if
not a l l kinds of pure economic loss. The American Restatement41
requires as a prerequisite to recovery in a strict product liability
action that the product be "unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property", thus precluding recovery for losses
related only to quality or performance inadequacies." American
courts, although they are not unanimous, limit strict products liabiiity recovery to damages to person or pr~perty.'~Similarly, most
--

38

39
40

41

42

43

-

-

enterprises: British Columbia, s. I, definition of supplier; Alberta, s. I (h).
The Ontario legislation only provides for remedies against persons who make
the offending consumer representations. Thus in Ontario, the potential defendants are limited to those suppliers who "make" a representation, statement, offer, request or proposal relating to consumer goods or services (s.
4(3) ) ; the same would seem to be true of Prince Edward Island (s. 4(2) ).
While the privity restriction would seem to be implicitly avoided in Ontario, it would still seem to be necessary to demonstrate that a particular
supplier engaged in positive information dissemination activities with respect
to the product in question. The mere supply of a consumer good to an intermediate supplier would appear to be insufficient In Newfoundland (s. 2 (g) )
the term "supplier" is defined to include non-direct suppliers who "offer or
advertise" the sale of consumer goods to a consumer. Again it would seem
to be necessary to demonstrate that the "supplier" engaged in information
dissemination.
Supra, note 26, a t 341-42. The Convention is set out in Ontario Law Reform
Commission, REPORTON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY( 1g7g), a t 165.
Law Commission, REPORTNO. 8 2 (1g77), at 35.
R.S.S. 1980, C. C-30, S. 5. The rationale for thii limitation is dicussed in
L. J. Romero, The Consumer Products Warranties Act (1978-79) 43 SASK.
L. REV. 81, at 189-92.
American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF THE LAW OF TORTS
(1965) s. 402A. See Comments g, h, i.
W. Kimble and R. 0. Lesher, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY(1g7g), at 79-80; Texsun Feed Yards Inc. u. Raiston Purina Co. 447 F.nd 660 (5th Cm. I 97 I).
See Seely v. White Motor Co. 403 P.2d 145 (CAL.SUP. CT. 1965) at 150-51;
Morrow u. New Moon Homes, Inc. 548 P.2d 279 (ALASKA
SUP. CT. 1976) ;
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American courts have denied recovery in negligence for economic
losses.M As well, recovery against remote suppliers under implied
warranty doctrines of the Uniform Commercial Code has not been
extended to pure economic loss. The vast majority of states has
adopted a formulation of Article 2-3I 8 of the Code which limits
buyer recovery to personal injuries. Only three states extend recovery to pure economic loss.45
Junior Books, as a common law decision, must be evaluated in
light of this array of common law and legislative reform. Its significance should not be underestimated, as it clearly demonstrates a
judicial attitude which favours expansion of tort recovery. The
paradigm which I set out earlierMimplicitly acknowledges that the
focus of my attention is on ithe activities or processes which occur
before the loss which the plaintiff is asking the court to shift to the
defendant. This ex ante approach to Junior Books looks at k k s of
economic loss, and assesses judicial decisions which signal actors
that they must take into account the p&biity that others may be
less well off (or worse off) as a result of their activities. This view
reflects my concern that the legal rules we choose will influence behaviour, so that we must assess recovery of economic loss from the
perspective of decision-making in situations where the relevant actors are aware of the future uncertain probability of accidents and
damage valuation. The result of this analysis is not always the same
as that obtained through the "traditional ex post approach to legal
scholar~hip".'~

"
45

46
47

Iowa Electric Light B Power Co. v. Allk Chalmers Mfg. Co. 360 F. SUPP.
25 (1973); Avenell et al. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 324 N.E.2d 583
(OHIOCT. APP. 1974) ;Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers et al. 557
S.W.2d 77 ( T E ~ SUP.
s
CT. 1977)~a t 79. See generally, P. Sherman, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(1981)~a t 287-90; J. E. Beasley, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
AND
THE UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS
REQUIREMENT
(198 I ), a t 639-44.
The minority view is reflected in such decisions as Russell v. Ford Motor
Co. 575 P.2d 1383 (OR. SUP. CT. 1978) ;John R . Dudley Construction Inc.
v. Drott Mfg. Co. 66 A.D.2d 368 (N.Y.A.D. 1979); Santor v. A. B M .
Karaghuesian Inc. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. SUP. CT. 1965).
W. P. Keeton, D. G. Owen and J. E. Montgomery, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
AND
SAFETY(1980)~a t 932-33; Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor 234 S.E.2d 123 (GA.
CT. OF APP. 1977); Clark v. International Harvester Co. 581 P.rd 784
(IDAHOSUP. CT. 1978). Compare Berg v. General Motors Corp. 555 P.2d
818 (WASH. SUP. CT. 1976).
J. Honnold, THELAWOF SALESAND SALESFINANCINO
(4th ed. 1976), a t
149-51See text supra, following note 19.
C. G. Veljanovski, The Economic Theory of Tort Liability -Toward a Corrective Justice Approach, Ch. 5 in P. Burrow and C. G. Veljanovski, THE
E c o ~ o n n cAPPROACH
TO LAW (1g81), at I 28.
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It is my view that this ex ante approach has several advantages
in the evaluation of recovery of economic losses in tort. First, it explains cases in which what the court describes as economic loss has
been recovered, ,but in which the activity at issue created a risk of
damage to property,* or a risk of physical injury or loss of life.49
Second, when one conceptualizes the activity as the creation of a
risk of physical injury or property damage (rather than analyzing
the ex post situation of the plaintiff), it makes perfect sense that
cceconornicloss" incurred to eliminate a risk of personal injury or
property damage is treated in the same fashion as the injury or
damage itself, and thus is recoverable in tort.50 Third, the ex ante
allocation of risk analysis avoids ,the result selective and analytically
bankrupt doctrinal distinction between property damage to the
product sold or ,distributed (which represents a non-compensable
loss) and property damage to other property (which is compensable) .51 The distinction, while appealing at a superficial level, is
subject to a considerable degree of judicial manipulation permitting
recovery where the court, for unexpressed reasons, considers it app r ~ p r i a t e Fourth,
.~~
this risk analysis meets the argument that it is
artificial to develop different rules for property damage and economic loss, since it is "often accidental whether a defective product
causes one type of loss, or another, or both".53 Finally, this approach explains the distinction between permitting recovery of the

* See John R . Dudley
49

50

51

52

53

Construction Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., supra, note 43;
Morrison Steamship Co. v. Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1947] A.C.
265 (H.L.).
Lambert v. Lewis, supra, note 22. In that case the Court of Appeal was of
the view that the "economic loss" of a retailer, incurred through hi contractual liability to a customer which resulted from the death of members
of the plaintiffs family, was not recoverable in a tort action brought by the
retailer against a remote manufacturer. The House of Lords, however, indicated that this economic loss might very well be recoverable. [1981] I ALL
E.R. I 185, at I 192.
Riutow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, supra, note 14, a t 551 ;Anns
v. Merton London Borough Council 119783 A.C. 728 (H.L.) per Lord Wiberforce, at 760; Batty and Another v. Metropolitan Property Realizations
Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 554, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 500 (C.A.).
See J. G. Fleming, supra, note 18, at 166-67; P. F. Cane, supra, note 3;
Ital-Canadian Investments Ltd. v. North Shore Plumbing and Heating Co.
Ltd., supra, note 14.
Riutow Marine Ltd. v . Washington Iron Works, supra, note 14, per Ritchie
J., at S.C.R. 1207, D.L.R. 542; Chabot v. Ford Motor Company of Canada
Ltd. et al. ( I 982) 138 D.L.R. (3d) 417, at 447 (ONT. H.C.) ; Trans World
Airlines Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. SUP. CT.
19551, a t 290.
Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 2, a t 246.
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cost of replacing or repairing an article which is "defectiveyyin that
it presents a risk of an accident "of violence or collision with exand disallowing recovery of repair or replacement
ternal obje~ts",5~
costs associated with quality defects evidenced by internal deterioraThe criterion is the type of risk not the type of
tion or breakd~wn."~
loss.5s It is the potential danger which justifies recovery, since it is
the potential (marginal) cost which a remote supplier must assess
in determining (marginal) investments in accident avoidance and
reduction measures.
If one accepts that an understanding of the recovery of economic
loss in tort can be gained through an analysis of the allocation of
risks between non-contracting parties, a further step must be taken
to differentiate among the kinds of economic risks to which the remote supplier might have directed its attention. Direct economic
risks include first, the risk that the product is not as valuable as the
price which the buyer paid; and second, the risk that the product
is not as valuable as that which the buyer expected to receive.58Obvi-

55
56

57

"

Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 652 F a d 1165
(3rd CR. 1981), a t I 170; Fuller v. Ford Motor Company of Canada Ltd.
(1978) 94 D.L.R. (3d) 127,22 O.R. (2d) 764 (ONT.
CO. CT.).
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, note 54;
W . Prosser, LAWOF TORTS
(4th ed. 1971)~a t 665.
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, note 54,
a t I 172; Northern Power d En'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp. 623
P.2d 324 (ALASKA
SUP. CT. 1981), a t 329.
I admit that the l i e may not be easy to draw in some cases. See Industrial
Uniform Rental Company v. International Harvester Co. 61 PHILA. 141
(C. P. PHILA. 1981), discussed in C. C. Fallon, Physical Injury and Economic
Loss-the Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer (1981-82) 27 VILLANOVA
L. REV. 483, a t 498. A similar phenomenon is apparent in the case of
"ineffective" drugs. The drug does not pose a risk to health or safety in the
sense that it "causes" injury, and thus may be viewed as creating only an
economic risk. At the same time the user may, in choosing an ineffective
drug, fail to use an effective product and thus expose himself to a risk to
personal safety or health.
See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence (1966) 66
Co~uar.L. REV. 917. My definition is somewhat different than that set out
in the note. See also Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for 'Economic Loss'' Damages Tort or Contract? (1966) 1x4 U . PA.
L. REV. 539, a t 541.
Recovery of this "loss of bargain" or disappointed expectation has consistently
been denied in tort actions: Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd. [1969] 2
Q.B. 158, [1969] 2 ALL E.R. I 19 (C.A.) ;Morin Technical Services (1978)
Ltd. v. Morin et al. (1982) 20 B.L.R. 191, a t 213-15 (ALTA.Q.B.) Beaver
Lumber Co. Ltd. v. McLenaghan et al. (1983) 143 D.L.R. (3d) 139, at
148-49 (SASK.C.A.)
However, in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon [1976] Q.B. 801, 119763
2 ALL E.R. 5, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 583 (C.A.), Lord Denning permitted recovery bf an "alternate opportunity cost" representing the foregone profits available or an alternative investment which would have been made had the tort

.

.
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ously there is considerable overlap between these two sub-categories
of economic risks. It is not clear which is discussed in Junior Books.
In many cases these risks can be re-articulated as the risk that the
buyer will incur expenses to repair or replace the good so that the
buyer possesses a good with a market value equivalent either to the
contract price or to the buyer's expected value.59These risks are, at
least in their formulation, clearly related to the contractual concepts
of merchantability and reasonable fitness for purpose, a similarity
that was acknowledged by the House of lord^.^' Until Junior Books,
the risk of direct economic losses resulting from "qualitative defects7'pl and of disappointed expectations of value associated with
activities which present no risk of property damage or physical injury, have been allocated, as between a remote supplier and a buyer,
to the buyer both in contracte2and in tort.63
In addition to these risks of direct economic loss, tort law has also
had to assign the risk of consequential financial losses either to the
remote supplier or buyer. This consequential economic risk may be
further broken into two subsidiary elements. First, either the remote
supplier or the buyer must take into account the risk that the buyer
may incur expenses which would not otherwise be required if the

59

60

61

62

63

not been committed. See also Woolridge v. H. B. Nickerson B Sons, Ltd. et
al. (1980) 40 N.S.R. (2d) 388, a t 404-07 and a t 444-45 (N.S.S.C. APP.
D.), afYg (1980) 39 N.S.R. (2d) 45 (N.S.S.C.) ; Ross v. Caunters [1980]
I CH. 297, a t 321 (CH. D.).
Note, supra, note 57, at 918; S. Waddams, PRODUCTS
L I A B I L I(2nd
~
ed.
1g80), a t 32; P. F. Cane, supra, note 3, at 130.
See Iunior Books, supra, note I, per Lord Keith, a t 485 and per Lord Roskill,
at 495.
R. M. Wattson and D. E. Bland, Economic Loss: A Subrogated Insurer's Kiss
of Death (1983) 18 FORUM
649, at 650.
In contract law the doctrine of privity of contract precludes recovery. See
Fraser-Bruce Maritimes Ltd. v. Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(1981) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 312 (N.S.S.C. APP. D.) ; Greenwood Shopping
Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie et al. [1g80] 2 S.C.R. 228, I I I D.L.R. (3d) 257;
Sigurdson et al. v. Hillcrest Service Ltd. ( 1977) 73 D.L.R. (3d) 132, [1g77]
I W.W.R. 740 (SASK.Q.B.). See J. A. Smillie, supra, note 3, at 277. This
restriction is subject to collateral contract claims which are permitted in
direct relations. See cases cited supra, note 22.
See cases cited supra, note 14. Thomas et al. v. Whitehouse (1979) 95
D.L.R. (3d) 762 (N.B.S.C.). But see Western Processing and Cold Storage
Ltd. et al. v. Hamilton Construction Co. Ltd. et al. (1965) 51 D.L.R. (nd)
245 (MAN.C.A.).
Of course, if the remote supplier and buyer are dealing directly with each
other in a planned activity, the court may award costs of repairs on Hedley
Byrne principles. See cases cited supra, note 23. See also Robert Simpson
Co. Ltd. et al. v . Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. et al. (1982) 36 O.R.
(2d) 97, at I 13-14 (ONT. C.A.).
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product accords with his expectati~ns.~
Second, either the remote
supplier or buyer must take into account athat the buyer may not
be able .to generate revenue or profits to the same degree as he
could have had the product performed as expected.=. Again the
generally accepted view is that consequential economic loss is not
recoverable in tort against remote suppliersPGJunior Books clearly
and unequivocally establishes that, in principle, both kinds of direct
economic risks and both kinds of consequential economic risks6?will,
at least in a limited set of cases, be assigned to the remote manufa c t ~ r e r . ~
It is my view that, on balance, the decision in Junior Books is an
undesirable development in the law. As I explain, the decision might
be supportable if limited to the allocation of catastrophic consequential economic risks to direct non-contractual suppliers in non-commercial settings where loss-spreading and consumer misperception
of quality provide persuasive arguments for recovery. At the same
time I believe, for several reasons, that it is inappropriate in most
cases to assign the risk of direct and consequential economic losses
to remote suppliers.
Firstythe benefits associated with the internalization of these costs
to the manufacturing process must be evaluated in light of the costs
of the loss-shifting mechanism, which in this case include the increased social and private costs of judicial administration of such
claims. It is difficult to understand the view of the House of Lords
that the social costs engendered through the establishment of the
~4

GG

67

These expenses may themselves be further described as out of pocket expenses, and liability to third parties associated with the malfunctioning or
inadequate product: W. Prosser, supra, note 55, a t 665-67.
See Note, supra, note 57; S. Waddams, supra, note 59, a t 35. For the purposes of this discussion, consequential economic loss will refer to any financial
liability or expectation which is incurred or frustrated as a result of the
supply of a product, except direct economic loss. The range of possible consequential economic losses is infinite. See S. Waddams, id., generally.
See cases cited supra, note 14, and S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W. J .
Whittal 6' Son, supra, note 15, a t 344. But see Maughan et al. v. International Harvester Co. of Canada Ltd. (1980) I 12 D.L.R. (3d) 243, a t 249
(N.S.S.C. APP. D.).
However, if the buyer articulates his claim as a negligent failure to warn,
consequential economic losses related to the untimeIiness of the warning or
to the failure to warn in general may be recoverable. See Rivtow Marine
Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, supra, note 14; Labrecque v. Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 289 (SASK.Q.B.).
It is clear, in addition, that expectation interests represented by future profits
were considered compensable entitlements. See Junior Books, supra, note I,
a t 480.
Supra, note I I.
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right to compensation must be ignored by legal decision-makers,
The "floodgates" argument is neither specious nor doctrinaire as
Lord Roskill so bluntly put it."' Given limited judicial resources, the
allocation of some part of those resources to the shifting of economic losses from one individual to another must mean that those
resources will not be available for other purposes. The trade-off is
inevitable, and in assessing the desirability of using ,the courts to
resolve disputes relating to economic risks, we must identify the
foregone opportunities which such a decision entails.7oShifting losses
is a social activity which has its own costs and should not be undertaken unless one can demonstrate a net social gain."
A second rationale for denying recovery of economic losses is related to this concern with litigation costs. Some commentators have
expressed the view that legal rules should be developed so as to
channel economic losses through one party when an activity presents risks to numerous potential plaintiff^.'^ Where the economic
losses are likely to be relatively small (as in the case of direct economic losses), and possibly widespread, and where the loss-shifting
litigation costs are high, social welfare may be maximized by denying recovery for economic losses by buyers against remote suppliers.
This denial of recovery will result, where contracting costs are relatively low, in the channelling of the economic losses to the intermediate supplier.73Buyers, since they are in direct contractual relationships with their intermediate suppliers, can at a low marginal
transaction cost either shift the risk to the intermediate suppliers, or
If these arrangeassume the risk in exchange for a price red~ction.~"
ments can occur (and in the factual paradigm I have presented this
is likely to be the case), the ex Post loss-shifting mechanism between
69

70

71

72

73
74

Junior Books, supra, note I , at 494, citing Cooke J., in Bowen v. Paramount
Builders (Hamilton) Ltd. [I9771 I N.Z.L.R. 394, at 394 and 422. Compare
Robins Dry Dock B Repair Co. v . Flint et al. 275 U.S. 303 (1927) ;Electrochrome Ltd. v. Welsh Plastics Ltd. 119681 2 ALL E.R. 205 (ASSIZES).
See D. N. Dewees, J. R. S. Prichard, M. J. Trebilcock, CLASSA C ~ O NASS
A REGULATORY
INSTRUMENT
( I 980).
S. Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law
of Torts (1980) g J . OF LEG.STUD.463.
M. J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts (1982) I I
J. OF LEG.STUD.281, at 283-84. Rizzo develops this thesis in the context of
channeling losses through one person who has suffered personal injury or
property damage, but there seems to be no reason to limit the argument to
that case.
Id.
Where he has assumed the risk, recovery should also be denied. See infra,
at text accompanying notes 93 and 100.
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buyers and remote supliers can be replaced by these channelling
contracts. The courts have on several occasions expressly endorsed
this rationale and have held that remote suppliers should not be
responsible for losses from which the buyers could have protected
themselves under an intermediate contract at a low marginal c0st.7~
Channelling costs are obviously low in the products liability context,
and expected litigation costs will certainly exceed them. If channelling contracts are desirable (and I demonstrate later that this is
likely -to be so), ,then denial of recovery for economic losses is preferred if it produces a tendency for these channelling terms to
emerge.
A third rationale for the denial of recovery of economic losses
looks at the positive benefits which the alleged tort creates. Put
simply, while the alleged negligence may result in a private cost to
the plaintiff, it will in many case. also result in a benefit to an
unknown third party whose resources will now be allocated to produce the economic benefits which the plaintiff can no longer enjoy.
The lost revenue of the plaintiff will be offset to some degree by
revenue generated by a competing firm or firms who will enter the
market in substitution for the plaintiff. What appears to be a net
social loss will in many cases simply represent a transfer payment
from one individual to an0ther.7~If that is true, and it will be at
least to some degree, ex post loss-shifting may not be desirable, since
net social welfare has not been reduced in any way by the apparent
injury. I n fact, if negligently inflicted economic losses (and thus
benefits) are randomly distributed, then in the long term an individual's apparent economic injury associated with one negligent act
may be offset by the quite invisible economic benefits which he may
enjoy due to to another negligent act?' Thus the administrative
costs of loss-shifting may not be necessary. Alternatively, if the law
permits recovery of economic losses, it should perhaps equally oblige
the beneficiaries (whoever they are) to compensate tortfeasers for
these positive externalities. The latter solution would clearly impose
78

76

77

See Byrd v. English 43 S.E. 419 (SUP. CT. OF GEORGIA
1903), at 420;
Robins Dry Dock €3Repair Co. v. Flint, supra, note 69. Deap Sea Tankers
Ltd. v. S.S. Tricape [1g58] S.C.R. 585, 16 D.L.R. (rd) 600.
W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort (1982) 2 OXFORD
J. OF LEGALSTUD.I,
at 3 and 14-17. But see supra, note 72, at 286-88.
A simiiar point has been made in the context of governmental decisions
affecting economic welfare. See M. J. Trebilcock and J. Quinn, Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change (1982) 32 U . OF T. L.J. 1x7,
at 160.
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substantial administrative costs, if it were possible at all, and in
the end it may be better to leave the economic losses (and gains)
where they fall.
A fourth rationale for denying recovery of economic lossa (i-e.,
for refusing .to sanction ex ante shifting of economic risks) is that
contrary to the view of ,the House of Lords:'
economic losses are
not the same as personal injury and property damage. Where consequential losses relate to personal injury or to damage to property,
one function of tort law is to provide mandatory insurance to product users in respect of these kinds of risks.Tg It is quite possible to
argue that our concern with loss-spreading through the establishment of this "safety netHs0and our apparent social attitudes that
health and safety risks (and care) should not be allocated through
the market are concerns and attitudes which do not apply to financial losses. Where personal injury and property damage occur, we
create almost unlimited private law compensatory rules, identical
for all intents and purposes in contract and ,tort."' Economic risks
are, however, qualitatively and categorically distinct from risks of
personal injury and property damage.
Some writers have suggested that we intuitively view injury to
one's person as more significant than injury to one's economic
status.= And a review of the history of social welfare legislation
suggests that social planners, in allocating resources to social insurance, have consistently emphasized insurance for personal injuries
See Junior Books, supra, note I, per Lord Roskill, a t 490-91.
G. Calabresi, THECOSTSOF ACCIDENTS
(1970); J. A. Smiilie, supra, note
3, at 234-35. F. Harper and F. James, THELAW OF TORTS(1956), a t
759-84.
s o That is not to say that we ignore individual economic catastrophes, but
simply that we do not perceive them nor treat them in the same way as we
do individual personal injury.
81 H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham d Co. 119781 I Q.B. 791
(C.A.) (contrasting personal injury, property damage and ensuing expense,
with lost profits). See H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honor&,CAUSATION
IN LAW
(1959), at 281-87. Asamera Oil Corp. Ltd. v . Sea Oil d General Corporation: Bund Corp. N.V. v. Brook [1g7g] I S.C.R. 633, 89 D.L.R. (3d) I.
See C. Coval, J. C. Smith and J. Rush, "Out of the Maze": Towards a
"Clear Understandinp" o f the Test for Remoteness o f Damaees
" in Neelipence
(1983) 61 CAN.BAR-RE~.
559, at'575.
The distinction has been recognized in the United States. See Posttape
Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co. 537 F.rd 75 I (3rd CIR. I g76), Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, note 54. Cf. Caltex Oil
(Aust.)
Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge ccWillemstad" (1976) 136 C.L.R. 529 (AUST.
n ,
H.G.).
78

79

-"

--

82

See R. Hayes, The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic Loss
(1979) 12 MELBOURNE
UNIV. L. REV. 79, at 80-81. See E. Weinrib, The
Case for a Duty to Rescue (1980) go YALEL.J. 247, at 286-87.
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and property damage over pure economic losses.83For reasons which
space does not permit me to canvass here, we have decided that
health care benefits should be allocated by non-market (non-contractual) social institutions84 It would be inconsistent to allocate
health benefits and health risks in different ways. Thus tort law
recovery has obvious application to personal injury claims, while
the uninsured distribution of economic risks is left to the market.
In addition, personal injury and property damage (and indeed
out-of-pocket expenses) represent a movement from a position of
wealth to a position of less wealth on &e part of the plaintiff. This
actual loss, compensable in tort:5 must be contrasted with .the lost
opportunity of obtaining economic benefits. Recently, commentators
have suggested that the value one places on what one hopes or expects to obtain (i.e., the expressed willingness to pay for'a good)
is consistently and demonstrably less than the value one places on
what one has (i.e., one's asking price for an "owned" good) .86 The
injury represented by an unrealized economic opportunity may not
be perceived to be as serious as personal injury, property damage,
or injury to existing wealthy and thus the demand for legal recognition is attenuated. The entitlement represented by "expectation
of economic gain", while recognized in contract:'
may have been
quite rightly recognized (if recognized at all) as a weak interest in
tort law reflecting the view that the socid costs of loss-shifting may
be substantial and that the perceived private costs of the accident
are low.
83

See D. Guest, THEEXERGENCE
OF SOCIALSECURITY
IN CANADA
(1980)~

at 98-100. Workers Compensation legislation exemplifies this attitude: see
84

8s

86

87
88

Ch. 4.
See B. M. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials (1977) 27 U . OF
T. L.J. 142, a t 167-68.
See Dominion Tape of Canada Ltd. v. L . R . McDonald B Sons Ltd. et al.
[1g71] 3 O.R. 627 (ONT. CO. CT.). But see the comments of Wilson J.A., in
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Fatehi, supra, note 21, a t C.C.L.T. I 15, I 17.
D. K e ~ e d y , Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlements Problems: A Critique
(1981) 33 STAN.L. REV.387; S. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory and Ideology in the Coase Theorem (1979) 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
669; D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
I C AD. H. Gjerdingen, The Coase
Under Risk (1979) 47 E C O N O ~ ~ T R263;
Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought (1983) 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 71I, a t 753.
J. G. Fleming, supra, note 18, a t 166, 476.
But even here the recognition has been described as counter-intuitive. As
well, the rationale for contract recognition of expectation interests may extend beyond the redress of actual injury to the facilitation of economic
planning. See L. L. Fuller and W. R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages (1936) 46 YALEL.J. 52, a t 57.

Heinonline - - 18 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 305 1984

306

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL.

18:2

The fifth and perhaps most persuasive argument against recovery
of economic losses in tort relates to ,the relative ability of the remote
manufacturer and buyer to acquire knowledge of the risk of economic losses and to take appropriate accident prevention measures.89
Empirical evidence9' supports the intuitive view that consequential
economic risks are knowable, controllable, and insurableg1at a lower
marginal cost by ultimate users than by remote manufacturers?'
This point deserves to be investigated closely. In providing recovery
for economic losses in the products Gabiity context one is obliged
(in deciding to compensate "losses") to first determine the injured
party's reference point, namely the non-injured state to which the
law will return her. In product liability cases this reference point can
only be determined, as Lord Roskill reco@ed,93 by assessing the
buyer's contractual expectation. In many cases it will be the buyer
who will be in the better position to know what that means. I will
ignore the obvious doctrinal difficulties raised by decisions which
suggest that the liability of the remote manufacturer in tort can be
defined or affected by the terms of the contract between the buyer
and intermediate s u ~ p l i e r If
. ~ the buyer is in a better position to
69
90

91

92
93

94

See D. Riley, CONSEQUENTIAL
LOSSINSURANCE
AND CLAIMS(4th ed. 1977).
G. L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty (1981) go YALE
L.J. 1297, at 1307-19.
The risks may be insurable a t a lower marginal cost simply because the
insurer can assess the risk in the case of first party insurance much more
accurately than in the case of third party "economic product liability"
insurance. The latter may not even be available. See S. Waddams,. supra,
.
.
note 59, at 2 I 7-1g.
Of course. this mav not alwavs be true. Professional liabilitv insurance
providing d i r d party' liability coverage to lawyers, accountanti and other
information brokers will often provide coverage for economic risks, and it
is precisely here that tort law has expanded to provide recovery for pure
economic loss. See Ross v. Caunters, supra, note 58; N . Rafferty, The Tortious Liability of Professionals to their Contractual Clients, in F. N . Steele
and S. Rogers-Magnet, eds., ISSUES
IN TORT
LAW (1981), a t 251-56.
See W. Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance
(1983) 12 J. OF LEG.STUD.241, at 254.
Supra, note I. Lord Roskill admitted that an exclusion clause in the intermediate supplier-buyer retail contract "might in some circumstances limit
the duty of care". See also Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, at 481.
I t is interesting to note that the statutory reforms which have been suggested in this context, usually in sales legislation, adopt a similar view: that
is, that the "reference point" from which one assesses the plaintiffs injury
is defined, at least in part, by reference to all the terms of the immediate
sales contract, including any exclusion clause, between the ultimate consumer
and his seller. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 2, at
243-55, and Draft Bill s. 5-18(3) and s. 5.18 (4).
See Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie, supra, note 62; Canadian
General Electric Co. Ltd. v. Pickford B Black Ltd. 119711 S.C.R. 41, 14
D.L.R. (3d) 372. The same point has arisen, for example, in negligent
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predict the probability and magnitude of the economic risk, to invest
in preventive measures, and to obtain insurance against residual
risks, what purpose (other than a simple wealth transfeP5) is served
by tort rules which shift the loss from the buyer to the remote
manufacturer?
It may be true that the remote manufacturer may be in a position
to produce a good of a "better" quality in some sense of the word.
In the normal case, however, the remote manufacturer will not
know what "better" means. The variables which may influence a
buyer's expectation of value may include product design (in a
variety of aspect. relating perhaps to component compatibility, regulatory compliance, and sub-contract terms), durability (in a broad
range of uses and environments), ability to utilize specific raw materials, storage requirements, operating environment requirements,
country of origin, and an infinite range of performance characteristics. I t is impossible even to begin to define "valueyJ.Thus it is
nonsensical .to attempt to describe the remote manufacturer as having produced a "defective" good in some abstract sense. When the
remote manufacturer can do little to reduce the magnitude or probability of economic risks, the application of Junior Books will simply
transfer wealth from remote manufacturers to a small subgroup of
buyers who can persuade the courts that the manufacturer was
negligent. But that is not the end of the story.
What will occur if liability for economic risks is shifted to the
remote manufacturer is that the manufacturer will respond to the
legal disincentives by taking steps to ameliorate forseeable consequences of this legal allocation of risk. First, it may attempt to
obtain third party economic loss insurance. The evidence available
-
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misrepresentation cases where a contractual exclusion clause between A and
B may be relied upon by C when sued by A. See Hedley Byrne 6' Co. v.
Heller 6' Partners Ltd., supra, note 24.
One explanation for the relative ease with which the House of Lords
dealt this issue may be that Junior Books is a Scottish case, and these common law doctrinal diiculties do not exist in Scots law. Gt. Brit. Law Revision Committee, SIXTH INTERIM
REPORT,
STATUTEOF FRAUDS
AND THE
DOCTRINE
OF CONSIDERATION
( I 937), a t 25-30.
EconomistS would say that the loss, once it has occurred, is a "sunk cost"
and rationally should be irrelevant in respect of decisions as to the future.
The transfer of wealth from the remote manufacturer to the buyer simply
transforms the world from State A in which the buyer is $X poorer, to State
B in which the remote manufacturer is $X poorer. See P. Burrows and C. G.
Veljanovski, Introduction: The economic ap$roach to law, Ch. I in P.
Burrosvs and C. G. Veljanovski (eds.), supra, note 47, at 5.
The law cannot retrospectively- change the fact that the world is $X
poorer.
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at this time suggests that insurance is not commonly available in
respect of such risks.96Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, remote
manufacturers can take steps to reduce the costs of their activity by
self-insuringP7or by taking preventive measures to reduce the probability of the accident occurring: in other words, by "improving"
the quality of its products.
As I argued above, it is not clear that the marginal cost of accident prevention through improved quality is low. Given the range
of variables which relate to quality, the costs of product improvement may be quite high. Moreover, if ,the remote manufacturer is
unable to distinguish between classes of buyers to whom the product
will be directed, the improved-quality goods, whatever that means,
must be directed at some hypothetical consumer. The problem is
that users are apt to value different quality parameters in quite different ways and certainly to different degrees. Some users may prefer to pay a lower price for low quality goods; others may be willing
to pay a higher price for high quality goods.
If the remote manufacturer determines ,that modification of product quality is not feasible, and perhaps even if some product quality
alteration takes place, residual risks will be dealt with by insurance.
Again however, an inability to discriminate among buyers will result
in inefficiencies. Certainly highly risk-averse consumers will be purchasing insurance coverage at a lower price than would otherwise be
the case, since they will, to some degree at least, be subsidized by
less risk-averse consumers who are purchasing insurance they would
prefer to do without or at a higher price than they would willingly
pay. This subsidization is undesirable for at least two reasons. First,
highly risk-averse consumers will be receiving benefits at below the
price which they would otherwise be willing to pay (i.e., under a
direct sales contract or insurance scheme). This represents a foregone opportunity to the manufacturer which represents one aspect
of welfare loss. In addition, less risk-averse consumers pay a price
96

See Heppel, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
INSURANCE
(1967), Ch. 3; S. Waddams,
supra, note 59, at 214-18; M. Dewis, D. C. Hutchins and P. Madge,
PRODUCT
LIABILITY
( I g80), at 156-57; D. Tebbens, supra, note 26, at 13 I.
See Canadian Equipment Sales d Service Co. v. Continental Insurance Co.
(1975) g O.R. (2d) 7, 59 D.L.R. (3d) 333 (ONT. C.A.); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v . Benson d Hedges (Canada) Ltd. (1978) 85 D.L.R. (3d) 467
(S.C.C.)
An alternative which may be available only to those enterprises which have
a large enough class of product buyers to spread the loss through marginal
pricing decisions.

.
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which exceeds the value ,they place on the benefit?' This also represents a welfare 10s. It is not clear to me (thatwe want a legal rule
which results in those losses, and one cannot ignore the distributive
consequences of this insurance subsidization program from one
group of users to another.99
An evaluation of ,theseremote manufacturer responses must also
recognize the possibity that buyers will be insuring themselves
against product quality risks. Buyers can do this in a number of
ways, the most obvious of which is to obtain a contractual obligation
from their intermediate supplier pursuant to which the intermediate
supplier assumes responsibiity for economic losses associated with
defective goods. It is clear that at least some judges and commentators are aware of this p&b'ity, and thus in determiniig the
plaintiffs loss in Junior Books would have taken as their reference
point the contractual expectations of the remote buyer. Once we
say that the buyer assumes the risk or risks at issue under the intermediate supplier-buyer contract (the retail contract), we deny him
recovery against all parties.'OO Where a buyer can be said to have
m m e d certain risks under the retail contract, it is because he has
received a benefit under the exchange relationship (reflected in a
relative price reduction, an additional non-price benefit, or in a reduction in non-price costs which he would otherwise bear) which he
values more than the risk he m m e s under the contraGt. Over a
number of transactions we can assume that the buyer will consider
himself to be better off through receiving these immediate transactional benefits (and assuming the relevant economic risk) than he
would be by not receiving the benefits and instead being able to sue
the intermediate supplier for the loss once it occurs. It is efficient for
the purchaser to assume the risk (aswe may assume it is, looking only
at the tcvo contracting parties)"' and we consider that the riskshifting is .desirableJwe should, in evaluating Junior Books, recogSee R. Hirshhom, Regulating Quality in Product Markets in D. Dewees
(ed.), THE REGULATION
OF QUALITY
(1983), at 76. See also W. Oi, The
Economics of Product Safety (1973) 4 BELLJ. OF ECON.3.
99 These distributive consequences may very well be desirable in decisions to
allocate risks and accident prevention costs relating to personal safety.
100 One way in which this issue has been analyzed is by stating that the plaintifE should not be able to recover where he has a contract with a third party
in which the relevant risk was allocated to him. If recovery is based on
reliance, one can argue that in such a case the plaintiffs reliance on the
remote manufacturer's representations or conduct is unreasonable. See B. J.
Reiter, supra, note 36, at ngo-94.
101 See R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960) 3 J. LAWa ECON.I.
9s
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nize that establishing a right of recovery in tort against a remote
manufacturer will discourage the contractual risk-shifting.lo2
It is thii analysis which permits cost-benefit analysts (and indeed
the House of Lords itself) to state correctly that contractual risk
allocation to the ultimate purchaser should preclude recovery by
that purchaser. The function of the law is not to shift that loss to
the remote manufacturer, for if recovery is permitted the purchaser
in effect recovers twice: he gets paid to assume the risk, and then
when the risk occurs he gets paid again! As Mishan argues, the loss
'"takes its place as one of a number of economic consequences"103
which the decision-maker faces. The individual's reaction .to the loss
which occurs, no matter how catastrophic, is irrelevant. "Person A,
for example, may. . . rue his decision to take the risk. But this is
only a painful reminder of the fact that people come to regret a
great many choices ,they make."lo4 Thus recovery of economic losses
in tort, if it is recognized at all, must be limited, as was intimated
correctly in Junior Books, to those risls for which the buyer did not
assume responsibility under its direct contract with her intermediate
supplier.lo5Looking at the same issue from another perspective, it
I t is true that recovery of economic losses will encourage manufacturer
internalization of social costs and will provide incentives to manufacturers
to increase investment in product quality. As I suggest, however, i t is not
clear that manufacturers will be able to do this effectively.
As well, even if we think that cost internalization is desirable, allocation
of economic risks to manufacturers reduces the incentives of both contracting
parties (the buyer and intermediate supplier) to take measures to reduce the
risk of accidents and the consequences of accidents which do occur. See
W. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, supra, note 98; R. A. Epstein,
MODERNPRODUCTS
LIABILITYLAW (1980), at 41-42.
This consequence of risk allocation to remote manufacturers may not be
as serious in the case of personal injury risks as i t is in the case of economic
risks if one assumes that consumers may underestimate risks of product safety
and that intermediate suppliers and consumers normally can do little to
reduce the potential injuries and property damage associated with product
use. This is especially true if the risk is borne by non-contracting product
users, a situation more likely to occur in the case of physical injuries and
property damage than in the case of economic losses. I n the case of economic
risks relating to product value, it is quite clear that the exchange transaction
pennits the buyer and seller to reduce the risk by negotiating its allocation
by price adjustments and through modification of product description.
I03 E. J. Mishan, ELEMENTS
OF COSTBENEFITANALYSIS(2nd ed. 1976), at
I 04.
Id., at 108. See also A. D. Twerski, A. S. Weinstein, W. A. Donaher and
H. R. Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products LiabilityDesign Defect Litigation Comes of Age (1976) 61 CORN.L. REV. 495;
J. Guss, Product Quality - A Multidisciplinary Policy Perspective in The
New Consumer Protection Act of Quebec, MEREDITHMEMORIAL
LECTURES
(19791, at 159.
105 See S. M. Waddams, supra, note I, a t 104-05.
102
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seems plausible to argue that recovery should be denied whenever
the plaintiff could have made (ex ante) at a relatively low cost an
appropriate contract to shift economic loss "up streamayso to speak,
thus reducing the costs of litigation.lo6
Finally, recovery should be denied when the buyer has assumed
the risk of loss, since in cases where the risk has been assumed knowingly, the expected accident costs will have been taken into account
in the price of the good. When the price for the good reflects the
product's expected cost (including all expected "losses" associated
with quality defects and consequential expenses) then the apparent
"external" losses will have been internalized ex ante through a reduction in price. Recovery of economic losses in this case will result
in internalization twice, and thus an overinvestment in quality and
accident-reduction measures, and underproduction of the good?07
What looks like an externality is not?08 When buyers have appropriate information about product economic risks, the expected accil internalized ex ante, and thus ex post loss-shifting
dent losses ~ v i lbe
is unnecessary.lOg
I have attempted so far to demonstrate that loss-shifting between
buyers and remote manufacturers for economic losses wili in many
cases be unnecessary, may provide buyers with double recovery, will
reduce incentives both for contractual risk allocation and for alternate buyer accident reduction measures, may exacerbate subsidization of high-risk buyers by low-risk buyers, and finally may not in
the end reduce the costs of accidents to any si&cant degree. While
there may be arguments in favour of recovery in a limited context,
these arguments support neither the principle nor the result established in Junior Books.
The primary arguments in favour of recovery of economic losses
in tort focus on the abiity of the remote manufacturer to control
this risk ex ante. We must: recognize that there are at least two
108

M. J. Rizzo, supra, note 72, at 284-85.

S. Star, The Eficiency of Liability Rules in Determining Optional Product
Quality, in PAPERSAND COMMENTS
DELIVERED
AT THE EIGHTHANNUAL
WORKSHOP
ON COMAIERCIAL
AND CONSUMER
LAW( 1 9 8 0 ) ~at 153.
10s See C. G. Veljanovski, supra, note 47, at 139-40; H. Demsetz, Wealth Ownership and the Ownership of Rights (1972) I J. OF LEG.STUD.223.
I* There may, therefore, be an argument in favour of permitting recovery in
cases where information imperfections may result in imperfect ex ante bargains. Where buyers underestimate expected economic losses, tort recovery
may serve a valuable function in providing remote manufacturers with incentives to provide information. See C. G. Veljanovski, supra, note 47, at
139-40.
107
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techniques which would allow manufacturers to reduce accidents,
that is, to control the economic risks which tort law would allocate
to her. First, as I discussed earlier, the manufacturer can obtain
insurance against these risks, or self-insure if that is not possible.
As we have seen, however, this will certainly result in subsidization
of highly risk-averse buyers by less risk-averse buyers. In fact it is
logical to assume that high-risk buyers will attempt to select to
purchase such products, since if ,the remote manufacturer cannot
effectively distinguish among buyers they will be able to purchase
protection at a lower marginal cost than they would otherwise be
willing to pay. This problem of subsidization and adverse selection110
may be reduced by providing an incentive, as we do in contract
law, for buyers who face "unusual" economic risks to disclose them
to their suppliers.'" In contract law the information is disclosed to
sellers; in tort law this analysis would support mandatory disclosure
to remote manufacturers in respect of information which is likely
to be known to buyersF2 thus reducing the distributive consequences of buyer subsidization and permitting more accurate pricing.l13 If insurance is the remote manufacturer's response to tort
risks for economic losses, we should perhaps limit buyersy recovery
to expected losses which are likely .to be borne by substantial percentages of the buyer population.
The second possible response of the manufacturer to potential
tort losses is to redefine his wholesale contract obligations to his
immediate buyer, the intermediate supplier in my factual paradigm.
If tort liability to the buyer is premised upon a determination that
the remote manufacturer has breached his wholesale contract with
the intermediate supplier, the manufacturer can at a relatively low
marginal cost ,define and thus control the risks which he is assuming
in tort to unknown buyersY4 This limiting principle is supported
by one judgment in Junior Books115 and conforms to the "floating
W . Bishop, supra, note 92, at 246, 254-55is the classic instrumental rationale for Hadley v. Baxendale ( 1 8 5 4 )
g EXCH.341. See R. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study i n the Industrialization of the Law ( 1 9 7 5 ) 4 J. OF LEG.STUD. 249; R. Posner, Eco~onr~
ANALYSIS
c
OF LAW (2nd ed. 1g77), at 95.
112 See K. Swinton, Forseeability: Where Should the Award of Contract Damages Cease, supra, note 36, at 70-74.
113 W . Bishop, supra, note 92, at 255, 261.
114 See Institute o f Law Research and Reform, supra, note 30, at 124-25.
115 See supra, Note I : Lord Fraser at 482-83 and Waddams at 103-04; Young
d Marten Ltd. v. &Manus Childs Ltd., supra, note 18, per Lord Reid, at
469; note, Another Look at the "pure economic loss rule" 119831 Bus. L.J.
64, at 65.
110

111 This
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warrantyyyconcept which has been adopted in Quebec? and several American jurisdictions,ll7 and which is proposed in Ontario118
in the context of economic loss recovery by buyers against remote
manufacturers. This analysis 'has several advantages. First, as I said
earlier, under this formulation of liability, the remote manufacturer
can control his risks to a far greater degree than would otherwise
be the case. Second, ,the investment of judicial resources needed
to define what we mean by "negligence" in the context of product
quality risks is reduced ,to an absolute mi.~imum.l'~
Yet this accident control technique is far from perfect. First, the
remote manufacturer who seeks to rely on the terms of the wholesale contract between himself and the intermediate supplier when
sued in tort by a buyer may face considerable doctrinal difficulties.lZ0Second, the remote manufacturer even when defining his
direct contractual relationship must take into account unknown potential product users and unknown economic product risks. Thus
while the "floating warranty" concept does permit a measure of
remote manufacturer accident control, it still leaves untouched a
considerable area of risk. This difficulty may, however, be reduced
significantly if one limits recovery to relatively probable buyer risks
Supra, note 27.
See Article 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
118 Section 5.18 of the Draft Sale of Goods Act proposed by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission limits a buyer's rights and damage recovery against
manufacturers to the kinds of risks and liability limitations which the manufacturer assumed with the intermediate party. See Ontario Law Reform
Commission, supra, note 29.
"9 Any other definition of negligence would require the courts to decide that
efficient accident prevention measures could have been, but were not, undertaken by the remote manufacturer. Information about the marginal costs
of accident reduction techniques available to the manufacturer a t both preand post-production and distribution phases of his enterprise, about the
marginal benefit of such activities and about the pre-purchase and postpurchase marginal costs of accident reduction activities of the buyer (and
about the marginal benefits of those activities) is notoriously difficult to
obtain. See A. I. Ogus, Social Costs in a Private Law Setting (1983) 3
INT. REV.OF L. AND ECON.27, a t 35.
The "negligence as breach of contract" formulation permits us to take
advantage of the evidence that, as between the remote manufacturer and
intermediate supplier, the remote manufacturer is the least cost avoider, and
reduces the judicial resources which would otherwise be necessary to establish negligence standards. See Veljanovski, supra, note 47, a t 131; D. N.
Dewees, G. F. Mathewson, M. J. Trebiicock, Policy Alternatives in Quality
Regulation, Ch. 2 in D. N. Dewees (ed.), supra, note 98, at 32; Posner,
supra, note 1 x 1 , a t 137; H. Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability
Matter? (1972) I J. OF LEG.STUD.13, a t 28.
1%Since the remote manufacturer is not a party to the contract, he will not
generally be able to rely on its provisions to limit his legal responsibility in
tort. See cases supra, note 94.
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and to economic risks faced by buyers with whom the manufacturer
deals directly. Finally, the "floating warranty" concept ignores the
expectations and perhaps reliance of the buyer (whose loss is defined, as we have seen, ,by the terms of his contract) .la Unless the
buyer knows the terms of the wholesale contract (as was likely the
case in Junior Books), this control technique may not in reality
reduce accident costs.
A third argument which favours recovery of economic losses looks
to the nature and consequences of the economic injury. When the
economic losses are "catastrophic" it may be possible to justify recovery on the ground that society places a value on recovery that is
significantly higher than the private costs measured by the dollar
amount of the loss. The benefits to the individual and to others
from loss-spreading in the case of catastrophic losses may not be
fully taken into account by the individual buyer who, even where
he accurately assesses and values the risks, will only take into account his personal expected dollar amount of recovery?22 Put another way, the social benefit associated with recovery in these cases
increases as the magnitude of the individual loss increases.lZ3As
well in these cases, ,the increase in social welfare concomitant to
recovery may be associated with lower litigation costs?24 Accordingly, in cases of consequential economic loss of a catastrophic nature, and perhaps when these economic losses are suffered by individuals rather than firms? tort law should permit recovery. This
policy may explain both the case l a g z 6 and legislative reform of
farming equipment transactions which permit recovery against remote suppliers.lm It may also explain the suggestion of the Ontario
Law Reform Commission in its Report on Products Liability to per-

-

Junior Books, supra, note I, per Lord Roskill, at 495.
122 Supra, note 72, at 284.
Id., at 304.
124 I d .
2-25 Where economic losses are suffered in a personal context, the view that the
injured party will have first party insurance against these losses, and will be
in a better position to know of and to take preventive measures, which may
justify non-recovery of consequential economic loss in a business context, is
unrealistic. Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 38, at 82. P. S.
Atiyah, ACCIDENTS,
COMPENSATION
AND THE LAW (3rd ed. 1g80), at
89-9 I .
lZ6 See cases cited supra, note 23. Cf., Glanzer v. Shepard 135 N.E. 275
(N.Y.C.A. 1922).
127 Supra, note 33.
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mit recovery of economic losses in non-business ~0ntexts.l~
As one
court put it, "commercial losses often are reflected in personal sorrow."- Unfortunately the decision in Junior Books was neither
limited .to catastrophic losses nor to personal economic injury.
A fourth argument which favours recovery is that in some limited
set of cases we might believe that a reduction in consumer choice
may be desirable. If a particular class of transaction is characterized
by consumer misperception of quality then the regulatory impact of
tort recovery may be to remove from the market certain alternatives
which consumers should not have chosen and would not have
chosen if they had full knowledge.130 Again, however, Junior Books
itself is not obviously a case of buyer misperception of quality nor
does it appear representative of a class of cases where misperception
might be thought likely.
A Bth posible argument in favour of recovery of economic loss
is the avoidance of multiple transaction costs associated with individual insurance. If we believe that protection from a particular
economic risk is likely to be valued highly by a considerable proportion of the market, then "mandatory insurance" through tort law
and concomitant product pricing by remote manufacturers will constitute a single ,transaction alternative to multiple individual buyer
protection transactions either through contract or first party insurance.131The Court did not address the matter, but it seems unlikely
that any of the risks encountered in Junior Books are of this type.
Even where such risks occur, one should keep in mind the subsidization and adverse selection ineffeciencies discussed earlier which are
the cost of the notional insurance policy established by tort rec0very.1~~
Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 38, a t 84, 135. As well, the
New Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978,
c. C-18.1 while it provides for recovery of pure economic loss, excludes
recovery of losses suffered in a business capacity.
L
- Momanto Company v. Alden Lee& Inc. 326 A.2d go (1974)~a t 97; R. M.
Wattson and D. E. Bland, supra, note 61, a t 661; D. W. Noel and J. J.
Phillips, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY(2nd ed. 1982)~a t 293-94.
130 See R. Hirshhorn, Product Safety Regulation and the Hazardous Products
TECHNICAL
REPORTNO. 10, REGUAct, ECONOMICCOUNCILOF CANADA,
LATION REFERENCE
(1981)~a t g.
m J. Goldring and A. J. Duggan, Manufacturers' Liability and the Trade
PROPractice Act in A. J. Duggan and L. W. Darrell (eds.), CONSUMER
TECTION LAWANJ3 THEORY
(1980), a t 72.
These inefficiencies c;u! be reduced, to a degree, by restricting recovery to
immediate parties for high probability economic losses.
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This analysis of the arguments favouring recovery of economic
losses suggests that Junior Books, if restricted (or perhaps narrowed)
in its application, may represent a positive step in tort law. My concern with sthe general application of Junior Books is considerably
reduced if recovery is limited to cases where the parties are dealing
"face to face" or as the House of Lords put it, are in a situation
"falling only just short of a direot contractual relation~hip."'~~
The
reasons for this critical limitation are incontrovertible. First, recovery will be permitted only where the remote manufacturer is in a
position to know of or to acquire information relating to the product
quality characteristics valued by ,the buyer. This will ensure that
accident prevention measures directed at the particular buyer will
be feasible. Second, ,because the parties are dealing directly with
one another, the marginal transaction costs associated with shifting
the risk to the buyer where he is the more efficient cost avoider will
be low. Third, the direct relationship will permit manufacturers to
control the risks which .they face by providing the specific product
user with relevant product information: a method of accident reduction which is considered to be the least costly regulatory measure
available to remedy market dy~function.'~~
If Junior Books is limited to direct relationships when the marginal costs of ,bilateral information transfer are low, or perhaps to
cases of private consequential economic losses of a kind that large
numbers of consumers are apt to value highly, the decision may in
fact be justified. In a sense, economic risks will be shifted as a result
of reliance in precisely the same fashion as risk shifting under the
implied warranty provisions of sales legislation. The limiting principle of directness ensures that the marginal costs of private reallocation of such risks will be minimized. Unless these limiting principles are respected, the socialization of risks with its attendant
administrative costs, subsidization and welfare losses will have
reached its ultimate stage.135A riskless society is simply not possible.
133

Supra, note I, per Lord Fraser, at 482. The same point was made in Hedley
Byrne d Co. v. Heller and Partners, supra, note 24, per Lord Devlin who

described the tort action as associated with relationships equivalent to contract at A.C. 525-30.
134 AS well, information disclosure will reduce the search costs of the buyer.
See supra, note I 19: D. N. Dewees, G. F. Mathewson, M. J. Trebilcock, at
27-31 ; R. Hirshhorn, supra, note 98, at 57-60, 62-63; R. Hirshhorn, supra,
note 130, at 19-20.
135 It may be that the decision is a reflection of a growing tendency to dispense
with evidence of formal exchange transactions and voluntary express risk
assumption and to recognize a legal duty not to disappoint the reasonable

Heinonline - - 18 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 316 1984

1984

ECONOMIC LOSS

3'7

The risks will be borne by finns (and thus by entrepreneurs, investors, employees, creditom, and consumers) rather than by individuals and that in itself will not necessarily improve the welfare of
society.
reliance of others. See supra, note 36, at 242. For a decidedly negative
judicial commentary on this development, see Taylor J. in Soursos and
Soursos v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra, note I , at 724.
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